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POPULATION EQUALITY AND THE 
IMPOSITION OF RISK ON PARTISAN 
GERRYMANDERING
Justin Buchler†
INTRODUCTION
The requirement for equal population across legislative districts 
constrains partisan ambition by imposing risk on partisan 
gerrymanders. This risk comes from the fact that a party attempting a 
partisan gerrymander must give itself relatively narrow and, therefore,
potentially unstable majorities in a large number of districts. This 
Article examines the question of how much partisan advantage a 
party can take without running an uncomfortable risk of the plan 
backfiring. The Article estimates the size of the initial majority that a 
party must give itself in a district for that majority to be stable until 
the next round of redistricting and then calculates the number of safe 
districts the scheming party must cede to the disadvantaged party in 
order to guarantee the stability of its partisan advantage. This Article
finds that actual redistricting plans frequently create less of a partisan 
advantage than parties could safely take under reasonable 
assumptions. Hence, partisan ambition may be constrained by some 
factor other than the risk imposed by the population equality 
requirement.
Prior to the equal population requirement for legislative districts, a 
partisan gerrymander was a relatively straightforward proposition, 
carrying little risk and limited only by the precision of one’s data and 
one’s own brazenness. Consider the position of someone charged 
† Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Case Western Reserve 
University.
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with redrawing district lines without an equal population constraint. 
With partisan goals, perfect data, and no shame, the optimal strategy 
would be as follows: Group every voter affiliated with the 
disadvantaged party into a single, overpopulated district that 
maintains contiguity only by being so misshapen as to make Elbridge 
Gerry’s salamander look like the state of Wyoming, and divide the 
rest of the state’s population, consisting entirely of voters belonging 
to the advantaged party, into the remaining districts, which would be 
necessarily underpopulated. The resulting plan would give the 
disadvantaged party only one district, while giving the advantaged 
party perfectly stable majorities (by virtue of unanimity) in each of 
the remaining districts. Of course, such a plan would never be 
possible because one’s data can never be so precise (particularly since 
data were less precise in the pre-Baker v. Carr era anyway), and 
shame, if not a conscience may prevent mischief-makers from 
attempting anything so crass. In the absence of an equal population 
requirement, however, there is no legal barrier to such a scheme 
without an objective standard by which partisan gerrymanders may be 
rejected.1
The purpose of an equal population standard for legislative 
districts is not to place a limit on partisan ambition, and there are 
other philosophical reasons for such a standard. One of the interesting 
consequences of an equal population standard, however, is to limit 
partisan ambition by making the scheme described above illegal. 
Under an equal population standard, a party must be willing to run a 
risk in order to attempt a partisan gerrymander. 
The strategy for a partisan gerrymander after the Reapportionment 
Revolution is the “pack-and-crack” approach, so named for the way 
that disadvantaged party voters are grouped. Disadvantaged party 
voters are “packed” into a small set of districts with inefficiently large 
supermajorities, guaranteeing them victory in these districts, but by 
larger margins than they need. In the remaining districts, 
disadvantaged party voters are “cracked” into relatively large 
minorities so that the advantaged party retains relatively small 
majorities in a large number of districts. Since advantaged party 
voters are spread more efficiently across districts than disadvantaged 
party voters, the advantaged party is likely to win more seats than its 
overall proportion of the state’s population. 
1 In Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a 
redistricting plan could, in principle, be rejected because it is a partisan gerrymander, but the 
Court has declined to reject any redistricting plan on that basis because of a failure to agree on a 
standard by which partisan gerrymanders should be rejected.
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Unlike the previous scheme, however, this plan entails a risk. 
Consider an arbitrary group of thirty-three voters, consisting of 
twelve voters from Party A and twenty-one voters from Party B. If 
Party A must draw three districts of equal population, then, in 
principle, it can draw two districts consisting of six voters from Party 
A and five from Party B, and a third district consisting only of eleven
voters from Party B. Such a plan gives Party A a majority in two out 
of three districts, despite the fact that it only holds approximately one 
third of the group’s population. The problem with attempting to do so 
is that a slight shift in preferences can have devastating consequences. 
If just two voters from Party A switch allegiances, one from each of 
the two Party A-majority districts, Party A becomes the minority in all 
districts, and Party B wins all three districts. 
Grofman and Brunell refer to such a backfired attempt at a partisan 
gerrymander as a “dummymander,” and the potential for a 
dummymander means that under an equal population standard, a 
party must be willing to absorb a certain level of risk in order to take 
partisan advantage of drawing district lines.2 A risk-acceptant party 
may attempt a pack-and-crack scheme, while a more risk-averse party 
would prefer a bipartisan gerrymander, in which voters of each party 
are packed inefficiently into their districts, thus guaranteeing each 
party a certain number of seats beyond which it can go neither above 
nor below. Interestingly, bipartisan gerrymanders have a number of 
positive representational consequences, which suggests that when 
risk-aversion is combined with an equal population standard, partisan 
ambition can be checked, with small-d democratic benefits.3
2 Bernard Grofman & Thomas L. Brunell, The Art of the Dummymander: The Impact of 
Recent Redistricting on the Partisan Makeup of Sothern House Seats, in REDISTRICTING IN THE 
NEW MILLENNIUM 183, 184 (Peter Galderisi ed., 2005).
3 See THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE 
ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA 32–34 (2008) (asserting that voters in gerrymandered 
districts are more satisfied with the results of an election because the voters are more likely to 
have their preferred candidate win); JUSTIN BUCHLER, HIRING AND FIRING PUBLIC OFFICIALS:
RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF ELECTIONS 145–46 (2011) (arguing that bipartisan 
gerrymandering produces districts with more homogeneous constituencies; allowing elected 
officials to represent the interests and policies of a larger portion of their constituency than in a 
competitive district); Justin Buchler, Resolved, The Redistricting Process Should Be 
Nonpartisan: Con, in DEBATING REFORM 161–71 (Richard J. Ellis & Michael Nelson eds., 
2011) (arguing that more homogenous districts are in both voters and elected official’s best 
interests); Thomas L. Brunell & Justin Buchler, Ideological Representation and Competitive 
Congressional Elections, 28 ELECTORAL STUD. 448, 450 (2009) (arguing that less competitive 
elections elect representatives that are ideologically closer to their constitutions which in turn 
improves voter attitudes regarding their elected representatives and Congress); Thomas L. 
Brunell, Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Uncompetitive Districts Eliminates 
Gerrymanders, Enhances Representation, and Improves Attitudes Toward Congress, 39 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 77 (2006) (discussing the positive aspects of non-competitive districts); Justin 
Buchler, The Social Sub-Optimality of Competitive Elections, 133 PUB. CHOICE 439 (2007) 
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There is an important question, however, that has gone peculiarly 
unanswered. How much does the equal population standard limit 
partisan ambition? Put somewhat differently, how far can a scheming 
politician wade into the territory of a partisan gerrymander without 
incurring too much risk? This Article attempts to answer that question 
both theoretically and empirically. The results suggest that an 
ambitious politician could probably take more partisan advantage of 
controlling the process than most generally do while incurring 
relatively minimal risk.
I. HOW SAFE IS SAFE?
If the constraint that equal population places on partisan ambition 
is the imposition of risk, then our first task must be to measure that 
risk. Suppose that the party controlling the redistricting process has 
just over 25 percent of the population. In principle, that party can give 
itself a bare majority in a bare majority of districts (0.5 × 0.5 = 0.25), 
and win a majority of the seats despite having only one fourth of the 
state’s population. A party with a bare majority in the state, in 
principle, can give itself a bare majority of the population in each 
district by making each district a microcosm of the state, possibly 
then winning every district with only just over half of the state’s 
population. 
The problem with each of these strategies is that a bare majority 
does not guarantee victory. So, we must begin with a simple empirical 
question. How big of a majority must a scheming party give itself in a 
House district when drawing the lines in order to count on holding
that district until the next round of redistricting? Is 55 percent 
enough? It is a majority, but a party’s 55-45 percent partisan 
advantage in a district does not guarantee victory in that district. The 
majority party might field a weaker candidate than the minority party. 
Public opinion might shift over time. District populations change over 
time due to birth rates, death rates, and migration patterns. Many 
things can happen to cause the party with an initial partisan advantage 
in a district to lose that district at some point before the next census, 
(arguing that competitive elections: (1) do not produce socially optimal outcomes, (2) are not 
procedurally appropriate, and (3) do not imply healthy electoral procedures); Justin Buchler, 
The Statistical Properties of Competitive Districts: What the Central Limit Theorem Can Teach 
Us About Election Reform, 40 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 333 (2007) (arguing that competitive 
elections can produce negative consequences); Justin Buchler, Competition, Representation and 
Redistricting: The Case Against Competitive Congressional Districts, 17 J. THEORETICAL POL.
431 (2005) (arguing that non-competitive gerrymanders maximize the representativeness of 
political outcomes).
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and the slimmer the advantaged party’s initial majorities are in their 
own districts, the greater the risk that something will happen to cause 
them to lose these districts before the end of the redistricting cycle. 
So the important empirical question is: How big must a party make 
its initial majority before it can consider a district “safe” in practical 
terms? Given some restrictive parametric assumptions, statistical 
theory could answer that question, but those answers would, of 
course, be dependent on those parametric assumptions. There is no 
point in doing so when we can simply measure the risk empirically. If 
a party has a 55–45 percent advantage in a district, how often does 
that party win, empirically? All we need to do is to examine the 
frequency with which parties win congressional elections for any 
given initial partisan advantage.
Measuring partisan advantage in a district is a relatively 
straightforward matter. The most common measure of district 
partisanship is the presidential vote within a district since the primary 
determinant of vote choice in presidential elections is party 
identification. So, we can examine a party’s success rate in House 
elections in districts in which its presidential candidate gets between 
50 and 55 percent of the vote, when its candidate gets between 55 and 
60 percent, and so on.
Conventional wisdom holds that competitive districts are 
disappearing due to gerrymandering, in which case there will be an 
insufficient number of closely divided districts to examine in the 
modern era. Of course, though, this is empirically wrong. Figure 1, 
below, shows the proportion of House districts in presidential 
elections from 1952 to 2008 in which the two presidential candidates 
were separated by ten points or less in the two-party vote. For more 
detail, Figure 2 shows a histogram of Bill Clinton’s share of the two-
party vote within House districts in 1992, which was a presidential
election immediately following a round of redistricting. Figure 3 
shows a histogram of what Gore’s share of the two-party vote within 
House districts would have been in 2000 had the district lines looked 
the way they did in 2002, after that round of redistricting. All data 
were provided generously by Gary C. Jacobson.
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Figure 1: Percent of House districts with less than a ten-point gap 
between major party presidential candidates, by election.
Figure 2: Clinton’s 1992 share of the two-party vote by 1992 House 
district.
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Figure 3: Gore’s 2000 share of the two-party vote by 2002 House 
districts.
The results in these figures are quite clear, and they demonstrate 
that gerrymandering has done little to diminish the number of 
competitive districts since 1952, as I have noted elsewhere.4 The 
number of competitive districts has fluctuated essentially randomly 
since 1952, and both the post-1990 redistricting cycle and the post-
2000 redistricting cycle yielded ample competitive districts to 
examine. 
The following tables show how often each party wins House 
elections for any given range of partisan advantage when the district 
is initially drawn. Democratic and Republican advantages and 
victories are examined separately, as are the success rates following 
the 1990s redistricting plans and following the 2000s redistricting 
plans. As in Figure 3, the calculations for House elections in the 
2000’s are based on the percentages that Gore would have won in
2000 with 2002 district lines.
4 See e.g., Buchler, Resolved, supra note 3 (discussing the incentives of creating non-
competitive districts); Justin Buchler, The Inevitability of Gerrymandering: Winners and Losers 
Under Alternative Approaches to Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. 17 (2010) (examining the 
incentives to engage in by-partisan gerrymandering) 
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Table 1: The probability of Democratic victory in the House election 
by Bill Clinton’s 1992 share of the two-party vote.
Clinton 
Vote
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Average
(50%-55%) 63% 44% 47% 46% 46% 49%
(55%-60%) 82% 68% 75% 80% 80% 77%
(60%-65%) 85% 85% 85% 90% 93% 88%
(65+%) 100% 100% 97% 97% 97% 98%
Table 2: The probability of Republican victory in the House election 
by George H.W. Bush’s 1992 share of the two-party vote.
Bush 41 
Vote
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Average
(50%-55%) 56% 79% 78% 78% 77% 74%
(55%-60%) 75% 93% 95% 95% 95% 91%
(60%-65%) 93% 93% 96% 96% 96% 95%
(65+%) 88% 94% 100% 100% 100% 96%
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Table 3: The probability of Democratic victory in the House election 
by Al Gore’s 2000 share of the two-party vote.
Gore Vote 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Average
(50%-55%) 57% 55% 72% 81% 55% 64%
(55%-60%) 83% 85% 91% 96% 91% 89%
(60%-65%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(65+%) 100% 100% 100% 98% 100% 99%
Table 4: The probability of Republican victory in the House election 
by George W. Bush’s 2000 share of the two-party vote.
Bush 43 
Vote
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Average
(50%-55%) 79% 78% 63% 48% 79% 69%
(55%-60%) 83% 83% 72% 62% 93% 79%
(60%-65%) 92% 96% 96% 92% 100% 95%
(65+%) 89% 94% 89% 89% 98% 92%
Tables 1 through 4 show us how big a party’s initial majority must 
be in order to make a district truly safe. Consider Table 1. In 1992, 
Democrats won 63 percent of the House elections in districts in which 
Bill Clinton carried between 50 and 55 percent of the two-party vote. 
However, 1994 was a Republican wave election, which is exactly the 
point of the analysis here. In each election cycle from 1994 through 
2000, Democrats actually won a minority of the House seats in 
districts where Bill Clinton got between 50 and 55 percent of the two-
party vote in 1992. If Democrats had counted on those seats to be safe 
Democratic seats throughout the 1990s, they would have been sorely 
disappointed. This demonstrates precisely why it would be risky for a 
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party to give itself majorities between 50 and 55 percent hoping that 
those majorities will be stable for a decade. 
On the other hand, the districts in which Clinton got over 65 
percent of the two-party vote in 1992 were essentially solid 
Democratic seats for the decade, with minimal although non-zero 
risks. Tables 2 through 4 show similar patterns. Once a party reaches 
a 65 percent partisan advantage at the beginning of the cycle, the seats 
are relatively solid throughout the decade. Republicans had some 
difficulty with such districts in the 2000s, which makes some sense 
given the Democratic waves in 2006 and 2008, but to the degree that 
there is a threshold of relative safety, 65 percent seems to be a 
reasonable estimate of that threshold. This threshold still entails some 
risk, though, and that point is addressed in the conclusion.
Empirical analysis of party success in House elections suggests 
that if a party controlling the redistricting process wants to give itself 
majorities in a set of House districts that are likely to be reasonably 
stable throughout the decade, it should not give itself majorities of 
less than 65 percent in those districts. The question, then, is how 
many seats must a party cede to the opposing party to reach the 65 
percent threshold in its own districts? The answer to that question will 
tell us the degree to which the equal population standard checks 
partisan ambition by imposing risk. 
II. ACHIEVING STABLE MAJORITIES
The previous Section demonstrated that if a scheming party wants 
to ensure that it does not lose the seats in districts where it gave itself 
a majority, it should give itself at least a 65 to 35 percent partisan 
advantage in in those seats. Below that, the party begins to incur an 
uncomfortable level of risk because of the factors discussed earlier, 
such as the potential for public opinion to shift, population changes, 
or variation in candidate quality over time. However, if the party 
drawing district lines does not want to give itself less than 65% of the 
population in its own districts, that puts a limit on the number of 
districts in which it can hold a majority. 
So, this Section proposes a simple model for examining the 
relationship between the number of districts that a scheming party 
attempts to take and the size of the majority the scheming party must 
give itself in those districts to maintain population equality. The 
model uses four simple factors (N, d, p, e). Let N represent the 
number of districts a state must draw. Let us assume, for the sake of 
mathematical convenience, that all voters belong either to the 
“advantaged” party, meaning the party redrawing district lines, or the 
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“disadvantaged” party, meaning the party that does not control the 
redistricting process. Let d represent the proportion of the state’s 
population belonging to the disadvantaged party. Thus, (1 - d) is the 
proportion of the state’s population belonging to the advantaged 
party. Let p represent the number of districts that the advantaged 
party will pack with inefficiently large supermajorities of the
disadvantaged party. Finally, let e represent the efficiency of that 
packing. That efficiency figure is a number between 0 and 1 
representing the proportion of voters in a packed district belonging to 
the disadvantaged party. For example, if the advantaged party packs 
opposing party voters into districts such that they constitute an 80 
percent majority in any given packed district, then e = 0.8.
For any given combination of values for N, d, p and e, we can 
calculate the proportion of voters outside the disadvantaged party’s 
packed districts who are affiliated with the advantaged party. If the 
advantaged party divides its voters equally in the districts it attempts 
to take, then this proportion will be the advantaged party’s majority 
size in each of the unpacked districts. That proportion is derived 
below.
First, p/N is the proportion of the state’s population residing in the 
districts packed with disadvantaged party voters. Since the proportion 
of the population in each of these districts consisting of disadvantaged 
party voters is e (by definition), it follows that (ep)/N is the proportion 
of the state’s population consisting of disadvantaged party voters 
residing in the packed districts. Since the proportion of the state’s 
population consisting of disadvantaged party voters is d, it follows 
that d - (ep/N) is the proportion of the state’s population that belongs 
to the disadvantaged party and resides outside the “packed” districts.
Next, since there are N districts, p of which are packed with 
disadvantaged party voters, it follows that (N - p)/N is the proportion 
of the state’s total population residing outside the packed districts. 
Thus, the following figure is the proportion of the state’s population 
outside of the packed districts who belong to the disadvantaged party:
Since all voters belong either to the advantaged or disadvantaged 
party, the proportion of the state’s population outside of the packed 
districts who belong to the advantaged party is given by the 
following:
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So, if the advantaged party wants to spread these voters as 
efficiently as possible among the non-packed districts, it will give 
itself a majority in each of the non-packed districts equal to the 
following proportion:
Thus, we have the precise mathematical relationship between the 
number of districts that the advantaged party attempts to take, and its 
majority size in each district, given the number of districts in the 
state, each party’s proportion of the population, and the efficiency of 
the scheming party’s packing system.
Of course, the quantity described above contains four parameters, 
which makes it difficult to visualize. In order to facilitate 
interpretation, we can use a set of tables to calculate hypothetical 
values. For the sake of simplicity, let us examine a hypothetical state 
with 20 districts, so N = 20. Furthermore, let us begin with the 
hypothetical case of 100 percent efficiency of packing, so e = 1. So, 
the advantaged party can pack disadvantaged party voters into 
districts with such efficiency that every voter in the packed districts 
belongs to the disadvantaged party. How large will advantaged party 
majorities be in the non-packed districts? Obviously, that depends on 
the advantaged party’s proportion of the population and the number 
of districts that they pack with disadvantaged party voters. Let us 
assume that the party drawing the lines is the majority party, and 
since 65 percent seems to be an analytically useful threshold, let us 
examine values of d from .35 to .49, representing majority party 
populations ranging from 51 to 65 percent. Furthermore, let us 
examine the consequences of packing at least one and no more than 
eight districts with voters from the disadvantaged party. The table 
below shows the majority party’s percentage of the population in each 
non-packed district for any given minority party size and number of 
packed districts.
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Table 5: Majority size in non-packed districts, 20 districts and 100
percent packing of minority.
Number of Packed Minority Districts
Minority 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.35 68% 72% 76% 81% 87% 93%
0.36 67% 71% 75% 80% 85% 91% 98%
0.37 66% 70% 74% 79% 84% 90% 97%
0.38 65% 69% 73% 78% 83% 89% 95%
0.39 64% 68% 72% 76% 81% 87% 94%
0.4 63% 67% 71% 75% 80% 86% 92%
0.41 62% 66% 69% 74% 79% 84% 91% 98%
0.42 61% 64% 68% 73% 77% 83% 89% 97%
0.43 60% 63% 67% 71% 76% 81% 88% 95%
0.44 59% 62% 66% 70% 75% 80% 86% 93%
0.45 58% 61% 65% 69% 73% 79% 85% 92%
0.46 57% 60% 64% 68% 72% 77% 83% 90%
0.47 56% 59% 62% 66% 71% 76% 82% 88%
0.48 55% 58% 61% 65% 69% 74% 80% 87%
0.49 54% 57% 60% 64% 68% 73% 78% 85%
Table 5 shows, for example, that if the minority party represents 
45 percent of the population (d = 0.45), and the majority party packs 3 
out of 20 districts exclusively with voters of the minority party, then 
in each of the remaining 17 districts, the advantaged party will have 
the critical threshold of 65 percent of the population, and the minority 
party will have 35 percent of the population. Thus, by packing just 3
districts with perfect efficiency, the majority can give itself 65 percent 
majorities in the remaining districts rather than the riskier level of 55 
percent that it would have if it simply made each district a microcosm 
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of the state. By giving up three seats deterministically, the majority 
party makes its remaining seventeen seats essentially safe. With 100 
percent efficiency in its packing, a party with 55 percent of the 
population can give itself stable majorities in 85 percent of the 
districts of a state with 20 districts.
Of course, packing districts with 100 percent efficiency is never 
possible, so the calculations in Table 5 are not realistic assessments of 
the tradeoffs that parties make when they redraw district lines. So, let 
us examine a more realistic packing efficiency of 0.75. When e =
0.75, the majority party can pack minority party voters into a small 
number of districts such that in each packed district, 75 percent of 
voters belong to the state’s minority party. How do our calculations 
change? Table 6 below shows the proportion of each non-packed 
district belonging to the majority party given 75 percent packing 
efficiency and 20 districts in the state for any given number of packed 
districts and minority party population in the state.
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Table 6: Majority size in non-packed districts, 20 districts and 75
percent packing of minority.
Number of Packed Minority Districts
Minority 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.35 67% 69% 72% 75% 78% 82% 87% 92%
0.36 66% 68% 71% 74% 77% 81% 85% 90%
0.37 65% 67% 70% 73% 76% 79% 83% 88%
0.38 64% 66% 69% 71% 74% 78% 82% 87%
0.39 63% 65% 67% 70% 73% 76% 80% 85%
0.4 62% 64% 66% 69% 72% 75% 79% 83%
0.41 61% 63% 65% 68% 70% 74% 77% 82%
0.42 60% 62% 64% 66% 69% 72% 76% 80%
0.43 59% 61% 63% 65% 68% 71% 74% 78%
0.44 58% 59% 61% 64% 66% 69% 73% 77%
0.45 57% 58% 60% 63% 65% 68% 71% 75%
0.46 56% 57% 59% 61% 64% 66% 70% 73%
0.47 54% 56% 58% 60% 62% 65% 68% 72%
0.48 53% 55% 57% 59% 61% 64% 67% 70%
0.49 52% 54% 56% 58% 60% 62% 65% 68%
The calculations in Table 6 differ somewhat from Table 5. When 
the majority party can only pack minority party voters into their 
districts with 75 percent efficiency rather than 100 percent efficiency, 
the majority party must be willing to give up more seats in order to 
achieve the same majority size in the non-packed districts. Now, if the 
minority party holds 45 percent of the state population (d = 0.45) and 
the majority party packs three districts with voters from the minority 
party, the majority party will hold 60 percent of the population in the 
remaining 17 non-packed districts. Thus, going from 100 percent 
efficiency in the packing scheme to 75 percent efficiency means that 
packing 3 districts gives the majority party only a 5 percent increase 
in its majority in the non-packed districts. 
If the scheming party with 55 percent of the population is willing 
to give up 5 districts, however, packing those 5 districts with minority 
party voters with 75 percent efficiency gives the scheming party the 
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critical threshold of 65 percent in the remaining 15 districts. Thus, in 
a state with 20 districts, a majority party representing 55 percent of 
the population can give itself stable majorities in 75 percent of the 
districts with a plausible packing system that is only 75 percent
efficient. The scheming party may lose one seat once in a while, 
giving it only 70 percent of the districts, but it is unlikely to lose more 
than that. That is a large representational gap. A party can, with 
minimal risk and a reasonable level of packing efficiency, achieve a 
20 percentage point seat-vote gap. 
In fact, what is perhaps most surprising about the magnitude of 
this gap is that we do not observe such gaps as frequently as we 
would expect. Consider the State of Ohio, which had 19 House 
districts after the 1990 census, and 18 House districts after the 2000 
census. Table 7 shows the proportion of U.S. House districts in Ohio 
won by the Democratic Party in each election beginning with 1992.
Table 7: Percent of U.S. House districts in Ohio won by Democrats.
Election Year Percent of Democratic wins in 
Ohio
1992 53%
1994 32%
1996 42%
1998 42%
2000 42%
2002 33%
2004 33%
2006 39%
2008 56%
2010 28%
2012] POPULATION EQUALITY AND PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 1053
It was not until the 2010 Republican sweep that a party approached 
the 75 percent figure that a 55 percent majority party could 
theoretically achieve with a 75 percent-efficient packing system in a 
20-district state. The post-2010 census redistricting plan passed in 
Ohio was seen by some as an attempt to consolidate the gains 
Republicans made in the 2010 wave election that carried them to 72 
percent of the U.S. House districts in Ohio.5 While some might be 
surprised by the fact that Republicans did not attempt to increase their 
advantage in U.S. House districts from the state beyond what they 
won in 2010, the analysis here suggests that they probably could not 
have pushed their advantage much further without running an 
uncomfortable level of risk. The surprise is that more parties do not 
attempt to secure so many seats given the relatively modest risks. The 
mystery is not why Republicans attempted to use redistricting in Ohio 
to consolidate their 2010 gains. The mystery is why we do not
observe parties attempting to create such disproportionalities more 
frequently.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented some simple calculations to show 
exactly how much the equal population requirement constrains the 
impulse towards a partisan gerrymander. But the Article cannot 
deduce an optimal party strategy. After all, a party’s optimal strategy 
depends on its level of risk aversion. A risk-averse party’s optimal 
choice may be something close to a bipartisan gerrymander, whereas 
a risk-acceptant party’s optimal choice may be to attempt an 
egregious partisan gerrymander. One could easily construct a utility 
function for a party’s number of seats that makes a bipartisan 
gerrymander optimal, and one could easily construct a utility function 
for a party’s number of seats that makes a very risky partisan 
gerrymander optimal. The calculations in this Article, however, show 
the actual nature of the tradeoff, and the surprising thing is how far a 
risk-averse party can go taking partisan advantage without running 
serious risks. After all, in a state with 20 districts, a party with a 55 
percent majority can win 75 percent of legislative districts if they can 
pack the remaining districts with minority party voters with 75 
percent efficiency. That twenty point seat-vote gap is larger than the 
5 See David Kushma, Ohio Gerrymander Another GOP Overreach, TOLEDO BLADE
Sept. 25, 2011, at B5. Kushma noted that with the loss of two House districts from the state after 
the 2010 Census, the new redistricting plan could give Republicans 12 out of 16 House districts, 
yielding 75 percent of House districts in Ohio, which is roughly equal to the 72 percent of 
House districts in Ohio that Republicans won in 2010, given the loss of two districts from the 
state. Id.
62
1054 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:4
seat-vote gaps that we normally observe, which suggests that parties 
do not take as much partisan advantage of the process as they could. 
The reasons are unclear.
One possible explanation is that parties simply do not know how 
far they can go. While the calculations presented in this Article are 
not complicated, they are also not widely known. That parties would 
not go through similar calculations even if scholars have not bothered 
to do so is difficult to believe, but anecdotal evidence of 
“dummymanders” may have more impact of their decisions than 
abstract calculations.
Alternatively, parties may simply be more risk-averse than even 
this Article suggests. The calculations discussed above were based on 
a threshold of safety that occurs when a party has an initial majority 
of 65 percent within a district. But even at an initial majority of 65 
percent, the majority party runs some risk of loss, as Tables 1 through 
4 demonstrated. So, perhaps scheming parties simply want to give 
themselves even more stable majorities. The problem with this 
explanation is the surprisingly large number of districts in which the 
parties are separated by less than ten points in the presidential vote. 
The frequency with which we see these districts suggests that parties 
are not simply adopting the most risk-averse partisan plans. After all, 
a risk-averse partisan gerrymander in which the majority party gives 
itself 70 percent majorities in its own districts and gives the minority 
party 80 percent majorities in their districts will still yield zero 
districts where the presidential candidates are separated by less than 
ten points, but empirically, the number of such districts is usually well 
above 20 percent of all House districts. So, unusually high levels of 
risk aversion cannot explain the failure of parties to take the 
maximum amount of partisan advantage.
That leaves two possibilities, between which this Article cannot 
distinguish. First, parties may simply have too many other 
considerations. After all, some legislators might prefer a district with 
a less extreme partisan imbalance, either because they view 
themselves as moderates, or because they ran for office originally 
from a district overlapping with their previous office (e.g., a state 
legislative district), and they want to avoid dramatic changes to their 
districts because they would rather maintain the same constituents 
with whom they have established relationships than form links with 
new constituents, even if those new constituents might be more 
strongly in the incumbent’s party. After all, members of Congress 
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painstakingly look for ways to establish direct relationships with their 
constituents.6
Alternatively, there may be other sources of constraint. Partisan 
officials could, in principle, feel some level of shame for an 
egregiously partisan gerrymander, or at least fear a political backlash 
if they go too far. There may even be legal consequences. While the 
Supreme Court has never overturned a redistricting plan because the 
plan is a partisan gerrymander, it has ruled that the issue is justiciable, 
and that a plan could, in theory, be such an egregious partisan 
gerrymander that it should be rejected.7 Without an explicit standard, 
though, partisan officials may be unwilling to push the legal limits. 
Ultimately, why parties do not press their partisan advantage as much 
as they could is unclear, but we cannot address the issue without 
examining the actual risks of a partisan gerrymander, and this Article
shows that the equal population standard imposes less risk on partisan 
gerrymanders than one might suspect.
6 See BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND 
ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE 27–97 (1987) (discussing the different ways elected representatives 
engage with a constituency); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR 
DISTRICTS 54–124 (1978) (discussing the ways in which a representative connects with a 
constituency). 
7 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (plurality op.).
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